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The Audible Life of the Image  
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University at Albany 
Since at least 1980 Godard’s cinema has been explicitly looking for (its) 
music, as if for its outside. In Sauve qui peut (la vie) Paul Godard hears, and 
asks about it coming through the hotel room wall, and it follows him down 
to the lobby, but remains “off,” like Marguerite Duras’s voice, in spite of his 
questions, until the final sequence. At that moment, at the end of the section 
entitled “Music,” the protagonist is at the same time struck by a car and 
struck by the entrance of the music into the diegetic present of the film, as 
the camera pans past an orchestra playing on the sidewalk while Paul fades 
off under the quizzical gaze of his daughter.1  By 2004, with Notre musique, it 
would seem to have taken over the whole text, for the film was announced 
as being about the collaboration between Godard and German record label 
ECM. In the context of that film it is difficult to determine both what that 
music is and who we are, although this discussion will try to advance a 
hypothesis in that regard. In fact, my main contention will be that music in 
Godard’s films functions as something like the absent image(s), not those it 
has lost but rather its cinema to come, what remains to be discovered and 
live within it, the survival of it. Not a cinema that cannot be seen, rather the 
image that can perhaps only be heard; and not the romantic or psychedelic 
dream of a synaesthetic apotheosis either, rather the technological 
coincidence of sonimage that has also been the precise direction of Godard’s 
cinematic research for more than thirty years. For the argument I will be 
making here is inscribed within my own investigation of what I call 
“technological life,” the means by which, in “prosthetic” symbiosis, or 
“dorsal” umbrality, a form lives beyond the simplistic opposition of animate 
and inanimate, or against the reductive presuppositions of autokinetic 
ipseity.2 
In one respect, already suggested by the name of Godard’s production 
company, but reinforced by a variety of commentators, having music seen, 
or having film function beyond the formal constraints of image and sound 
tracks, is what Godard has always aimed for. The filmmaker has himself has 
spoken of “the fact that musicians don’t need the image whereas people who 
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make images need music. I’ve always wanted to do a pan or tracking shot 
during a war scene or love scene, so that one can see the orchestra at the 
same time. So that the music takes over when there is no more need to see 
the image, so that music expresses something else. What interests me is to see 
music, to try to see what is heard and to hear what is seen.”3 In more general 
terms, however, in the context of “Godard’s life-long innovations in sound 
design,”4 one could cite, from as early as A bout de souffle, the opening of the 
invisible wall between on-screen actor and spectator; or the whole complex 
play of sound that begins when Belmondo shoots the sky. As a means of 
“anchoring” some of those considerations in a musical context, I shall 
discuss first two sequences from Week-end, where what becomes more 
explicit in Sauve qui peut is already heralded, then develop my thesis further 
vis-à-vis the relatively recent films Éloge de l’amour and Notre musique. A 
straightforward idea will guide me: Godard’s idea of music is inextricably 
related to his radical conception of montage, montage as a radical concept. 
That concept will be, in my terms, something like the possible impossibility, 
or compossibility, of a technological sovereignty. 
My reference to the concept, in the context of cinema, is of course a 
reference to Deleuze’s idea of what philosophy does best: “philosophy is the 
art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts.”5 And any discussion of 
cinema in the context of philosophy henceforth comes across Deleuze before 
it is able to advance at all. Among readers of Deleuze, Claire Colebrook is 
most explicit in relating the philosopher’s cinematic analyses to the question 
of life, specifically a life of intensity not reducible to the animate. 
“Philosophy,” she writes, “can only begin to think when it steps outside its 
own images of mind, reason and humanity. This is why Deleuze installs 
technology at the heart of philosophy and life. . . .  Only when the human 
encounters the inhuman will we know what the human body can do, and 
only when life opens itself up to violence, destruction, death and zero 
intensity will we be able to discern just what counts as ‘a’ single life . . . . it 
was [in Deleuze’s work on cinema] that he showed how creative philosophy 
and the human brain might become if we confronted our relation to 
machines.”6 
For Deleuze, cinema is about a technological thinking in images that is 
capable of changing the way the human brain thinks; it is about correlating 
and expanding the life of the mind in that sense. To quote Colebrook again: 
“life is perception, or a virtual power to relate and to image. . . . life is imaging, 
a plane of relations that take the form of perceptions precisely because 
something ‘is’ only its responses. Before there are actual terms – ‘mind’ on 
the one hand, ‘world’ on the other – there is a potential for relation, and 
relations for Deleuze are best described as images.”7 The logic I shall try to 
develop here relies to a great extent on those Deleuzian insights. As 
Colebrook argues them, they appear in contrast to, or as a radical extension 
of another, equally legitimate understanding of Deleuze as affirming life in 
D a v i d  W i l l s  |  4 5  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XVIII, No 2 (2010)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2010.212 
the Nietzschean sense. In his reading of Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, David 
Rodowick emphasizes how “the time-image lets us believe again in ‘life.’ 
This is neither a romantic nor a vague metaphysical concept. . . . life is 
change.”8 Quoting such passages as Deleuze’s invocation of the Nietzschean 
advocacy of “outpouring, ascending life, the kind which knows how to 
transform itself, to metamorphose itself according to the forces it 
encounters,”9 Rodowick makes clear that the stakes of such an affirmation of 
life involve thinking “what we have not yet become . . . . acknowledg[ing] 
change and becoming as forces, or the force of time as change.”10 An 
altogether different life, therefore. But that is a different emphasis from 
Colebrook’s insistence, as Deleuze puts it, on a “powerful, non-organic Life 
which grips the world.”11 
The 1967 film Week-end is one among many--no doubt any--of 
Godard’s first period commercial films that raise the question of the sonic 
other of the image. What makes it exemplary for my purposes—apart from 
its being the last film he made before his Dziga-Vertov collective 
experiment--is the fact of its well-known on-screen musical performance, 
one that is accompanied by a striking play of the image. About two thirds of 
the way through the film the murderous husband and wife protagonists, 
Roland and Corinne, hitch a ride on a truck driven by an itinerant pianist. In 
the following sequence we are treated to an Action Musicale (as the intertitle 
tells us) that consists of a single (7 minutes 18 seconds) shot consisting of 
three, almost 360° panoramic sweeps of a farm estate, to the accompaniment 
of Paul Gégauff playing a Mozart piano sonata. His piano has been installed 
in front of the barn and his audience consists of a more or less accidental 
assembly of curious or bored farmworkers, a couple of young lovers, and 
the protagonist couple. During the first two 360° counterclockwise pans, 
each of which lasts about two minutes, Gégauff twice plays a one minute 
extract of the sonata, stopping at approximately the same point to offer short 
discourses (53 seconds, 30 seconds) on the place of Mozart in the history of 
music. Following that, during a clockwise pan, he continues his performance 
for a little over 3½ minutes, up to the end of the sequence. 
There is therefore a coherence and unity to the sequence (a “scene” 
according to Metz’s categories12), which is precisely provided by the music 
and the pianist’s commentary (the only other dialogue consists of two quick, 
garbled questions or comments uttered by Corinne). That sonic coherence is 
reinforced by the fact that for three of its four static moments, the camera 
pauses on the pianist. The on-screen musical performance would therefore 
seem to provide the narrative signification of the sequence: what takes place is 
the recital. However, the visual track also offers two different, clearly 
identifiable cohering structures. The first is provided by a farmworker who 
is in the frame at the beginning of the take, and remains its focus until a 
point of divergence when the camera leaves him behind, just before it 
glimpses the couple I have referred to as young lovers are glimpsed walking 
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from background to foreground. The farmworker will reenter the frame 
almost six minutes later--in the third, clockwise panorama--now carrying a 
shovel that he seems to have gone to retrieve, ostensibly returning to his 
work (however much he dawdles), and he will disappear up the haybarn 
stairs, behind the piano, at the end of the sequence. He therefore reinforces a 
thematic of class opposition or conflict that has already been developed in 
the film, incarnating a proletarian counterpoint to the leisured class 
(although they are also predominantly rural workers) of idle music 
devotees. One would have to accept, within the context of the film up to this 
point, but also in view of the fact that the sequence begins and ends with his 
movements, that his actions constitute a narrative with as valid a claim to 
importance as the musical performance: what takes place is the farmworker 
going about his work. 
The contrast between laboring and leisured, or landed, classes is 
reinforced by the appearance of a second competing visual structure, which 
works around the couple of young lovers. They appear in the frame--to 
replace the disappearing workman--in front of the chateau, and might be 
imagined to have emerged from it. They inhabit the foreground for about 40 
seconds towards the end of the second panorama, approaching the piano to 
listen to the recital. The female character is played by Anne Wiazemsky, star 
of La Chinoise, and Godard’s new wife of a few months. She is captured 
sauntering alone in front of the camera for a few seconds of spectator 
delectation.  
 
If we understand this young couple to provide a contrast with the workman, 
they also provide a foil for the subjects of the third visual structure, the 
protagonists Roland and Corinne. They are discovered by the camera 20 
seconds into its first panorama, he standing yawning (same yawn each of 
the three times the camera finds him), she sitting, equally bored, so much so 
that early in the third panorama we notice her in the background, sitting at 
the feet of another man and holding his hand. She rejoins Roland a little over 
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a minute later, entering the frame from the right, and the camera pauses on 
the two of them for half a minute before again picking up the workman and 
following him back to the piano and the end of the panorama. Between the 
younger and older set of couples, there is reinforced the narrative of 
bourgeois life: what takes place is the bourgeoisie enjoying its weekend.  
 
The point at which the final pan leaves Roland and Corinne to resume 
its clockwise sweep coincides with both the re-entry into the frame of the 
workman with his shovel, and the resumption of the piano recital. At the 
precise moment when we see both the protagonist couple and the workman, 
and also hear the sonata taken up again, we cannot say which narrative 
structure is driving the film: our interest in the protagonists, the movement 
of the workman, or the flow of the music. Music has therefore been invested 
with a narrative content (and classical music, of course, follows its own 
classical narrative structures) that to some degree competes with the major 
diegetic and thematic forces of the film. More importantly, it has come to 
inhabit the image. For neither can we say with certainty whether it is one or 
the other narrative structure, or one or the other set of movement-images (all 
of which inhabit the same camera shot), or something like a force of music 
that is at that point driving the film, indeed constituting it. It is not just that 
we have seen music being played; rather we “see” what we hear, to the 
extent that it is imbricated in, intersects or coincides--at least at the moment 
in question--with the structures of coherence functioning on the image track. 
At the 57’18” mark, where we encounter this coincidence or intersection 
between, on the one hand, the workman and the music that we have been 
following from beginning to end of this sequence, and, on the other hand, 
the couple we have been watching since the beginning of the film, the music 
can be understood to be seen even in the absence of a visual representation of 
piano and pianist.  
Music here—and conversely, I would argue, the image—is therefore 
notable for a type of becoming-modernism different from its fragmentation 
in many, if not most, other films by Godard.  Douglas Morrey has pointed 
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out that these three panoramas provide a counterpoint to Week-end’s famous 
tracking shot of the traffic jam, roadwreck carnage, the former’s circularity 
contrasting with the latter’s linearity.13 Both are of similar length (a little 
more or less than 7½  minutes), and both provide a sustained continuity of 
non-montage film time (in the case of the panoramas it is a single shot, in the 
case of the tracking shot an as-if-single shot14). Similarly, the relative 
integrity of the musical interlude contrasts with the cacophonous mayhem 
of much of the rest of Week-end’s soundtrack, in particular two other on-
screen “performances,” the ubiquitous hornblasts of its first half, and the 
drumbeats that are constantly in the background of the Seine et Oise 
Liberation Front cell scenes. The Action musicale of Week-end thus constitutes 
a specific relationality of image and sound tracks, and among image, 
dialogue, ambient sounds, and music. 
However, in the repeated comprehensive panning of Week-end’s Action 
musicale, the spectator also sees the machinery of cinema; one cannot not be 
struck – experiencing the effects of a certain spatial disorientation – by the 
fact of seeing the camera turn through 360°. For, if the capacity to record 
movement provides a certain (tautological) definition of the moving picture, 
the cinema we are now acquainted with, and expect, derives rather from 
effects of montage combined with effects of a camera that records 
movement: that is what, for Deleuze, gives the movement-image. The 
Lumière Brothers in effect already produced that possibility, without 
knowing it, by stopping their static camera, acknowledging that if film had 
the capacity to reproduce the life of the living, it could not or would not 
preserve that life as flow. (However much they extend that possibility, Andy 
Warhol’s Sleep and Empire, and ultimately Michael Snow’s Wavelength, 
remain within its structural limits.) And as soon as Méliès filmed different 
scenes with a repositioned camera, film was well on the way to becoming an 
edited fiction. It would not be long before the basic constituent elements of a 
camera that stops and starts, dollies and pans, tilts and zooms, or is hoisted 
on a crane, were in play. Godard’s recourse, in Week-end, and in the context 
of cinema (his in particular, but also cinema in general--whether it rely on 
Eisensteinian montage or continuity editing), to exaggerated tracking and 
panoramic shots, necessarily returns us to a type of naïve cinematic 
apparatus. From that point of view, beyond the visual, sonic, and narrative 
structures I just outlined, the panoramic musical scene enacts a certain 
technological constitution of cinema, and, I would argue, posits that as a 
“becoming-music.” Within the limits of the sequence itself, such a becoming-
music remains actual, and territorialized, at least as long as the music is 
performed on-screen, within the diegetic structures. Paradoxically, for being 
perceived, its escapes the virtual reality that it will achieve in later films. But 
the possibility is, as it were, here put in place, on stage and into play: one 
sees the specific relationality of image, sound and camera movement, and 
one hears the music not just issuing from a piano being played on-screen, 
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but as music being made within that complex and specific cinematic 
relationality. 
 There is, however, another performance, what could be called another 
“sound performance” in Week-end. I refer to its second sequence, four 
minutes into the film, Corinne’s recital (the first word of the scene is her 
interlocutor’s command “Recommence,” suggesting some sort of repeat 
performance) of the facts of a tryst involving a male lover and his wife. A 
minute and a half into the 9 minute sequence we are given the intertitle 
“ANAL-YSE,” but however much the male interlocutor conduct himself like 
an analyst, we know him to be the man we were introduced to in the 
previous sequence as Corinne’s current lover, Paul. Besides, if this is an 
analytic séance, it is heavily erotically overdetermined, as she is sitting on 
the table at which he is seated smoking, in her underwear.  
 
The restricted camera movements might allow one to interpret this sequence 
as even more elemental cinema than the tracking shot of the traffic jam and 
the repeated panoramas of the Mozart recital, except that we have seen in 
film after film by Godard reworkings of the traditional shooting of a 
conversation: most clearly, there is no use of the shot/countershot 
convention. 
Corinne’s account of her threesome might be understood to “track” 
the long flux, obstructed or unimpeded, of voyeuristic desire, for that is 
what the male participant stages; or we might imagine her recital to produce 
some sort of virtual pan into the libidinal space of, first Paul, then beyond 
the 180° of the screen, toward the spectator. Like the Mozart recital, this 
sequence is also filmed as a single shot, with the camera remaining static 
except for limited zooming and panning. Once Paul has asked or told her to 
begin her narrative, it is Corinne who mostly occupies or dominates the 
frame, often in close-up, dimly lit and in relative contre-jour, so that the 
colors of the film are muted almost to monochrome.  
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She is in three-quarters profile as she recounts her tale, sparing no detail—
cunnilingus, masturbation, and substantial elements of anal eroticism and a 
tergo sex, as suggested by the intertitle. After 7½ minutes, she disappears in 
search of cigarettes, and returns to sit in the center of the frame in much 
more oblique right profile. For the remainder of the sequence we see only 
the back of her head obscuring Paul’s face all but completely. What she now 
retells, still recounting the prompting of the man who is directing the scene 
(“A la cuisine les minettes, à la cuisine”), becomes, progressively more 
recognizably, a re-enactment of the milk and eggs scenes from Bataille’s 
Story of the Eye.15 
The soundtrack to this sequence also seems to be traditionally 
conceived, reduced to a dominance of dialogue (or monologue), and 
accompanying music. But just as the image track frustrates the conventions 
of the filmed dialogue, being practically devoid of reaction shots, the main 
speaker either turning her head away from her interlocutor, or offering the 
spectator only the back of her head and shoulders, so dialogue and music 
function in competition one with the other, such that were it not for the 
English subtitles one would have only the suggestion of much of the explicit 
sexual material. For Corinne’s muffled voice is consistently drowned out by 
the often discordant and strident music when she is explaining details of the 
more perverse acts. Once again there are many other examples of such 
indistinct, or even silent speech in Godard’s films, which again leads one to 
place the sequence in the classic category with respect to his repertoire.16 If I 
am insisting on comparing and juxtaposing it with the Mozart recital, it is 
for reason of its continuous camera and relative calm—it has the tone of an 
interlude, and is immediately followed by the altercation with the neighbors 
and then the traffic jam—as well as the way in which the music points 
outside the image. What it “points to” most explicitly in this case is the 
perverse sexual activity that is being described. It would be impossible to 
determine whether the scene that is recounted in Mireille Darc’s soft 
melancholic monotone17 could in fact be represented more erotically in 
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visual terms; that is, after all, the whole challenge, and impasse, of so-called 
sexually graphic cinema. But in one obvious sense what occurs is that certain 
details get represented instead in musical terms. By intervening to replace 
the dialogue at certain, sexually explicit moments--apart from giving 
Godard an alibi in a pre-sexual-revolution societal, and cinematic ambience--
the music becomes a type of perceptual sign of the sex that is being 
unspoken, an “image” of the perversions that are being portrayed, at least 
structurally comparable to the classical cut or pan to a flaming fire at the 
point of consummation of the sex act. 
However, Godard is not that prosaically metaphorical, even if one 
could counter that the discordant music is appropriate to the sex we are 
hearing about. The music less replaces the dialogue to figure or signify 
sexual acts than it sounds in a generalized space of excess with respect to the 
image. Corinne’s distracted and detached recounting creates a strange 
disjunction between the scene’s presence as dialogue, and its being 
positioned “off.” It is thus already at least doubly absent, off screen and in 
the past, as well as detached from Corinne’s experience of it. Indeed, in 
response to Paul’s question at the end, “is it true or a nightmare?” she 
replies that she doesn’t know, which adds a further dimension of “irreality.” 
But if Corinne’s detachment plays into the complex erotic system of Paul’s 
desire (“Come here and excite me” is his request or command as the 
sequence ends), of the voice, of voyeurism, and of a generalized erotico-
exoticism that, of course, functions also for the spectator, if for those reasons 
the scene necessarily inscribes structures of distancing and plays on the 
unattainable object, I maintain that the music ensures that that is not the 
only way that the, or an outside is identified. Its effect, at those points where 
–again in a way that is comparable to the 57’ 18” mark near the end of the 
musical panorama – it coincides with or produces an indistinctness of the 
voice, is precisely that of indistinction, of a signifying imprecision or excess. 
And at that “level” we can understand a specific form of the intersection or 
coincidence just referred to, represented by the name of Bataille. For his text 
is “heard” only in a muffled or muted way also, through the indistinctness 
of Corinne’s voice and the discordance of the music, as well as by means of 
the somewhat oblique and unidentified reference to it (unlike, as we shall 
see, in Éloge de l’amour). Those familiar with Bataille’s novels may recognize 
the reference in play here, but the spectator in general necessarily has 
imposed upon them the disturbing effect of a polymorphous perversity, a 
contagion such as Bataille recounts in The Story of the Eye, echoing pell-mell 
through “the void that yawned within us by means of our entertainments 
with the eggs.”18 In the novel, that contagion or exceeding of the limits is 
indistinctly a multiplication of examples from the erotic repertory, and an 
overflowing of metonymic and metaphoric signifying processes—
culminating in a scene of cruelty the combines much of what is to come in 
Week-end, and more—adding up, especially for those who know Bataille, to 
an affirmation of sovereign desire, where the individual becomes less a 
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subject than a desiring flux or machine. Of course no music, in the pure or 
simple sense, however complex it might be, can figure that, and, as I have 
argued, figuration or signification is no longer what is in play. Rather, music 
playing off and across voice and image at least points in the direction where 
cinema begins to think otherwise. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Éloge de l’amour explicitly cites Bataille, in at least three forms, recited and 
reworked through the complex chronology and characterology of the film. 
In the longest reference, about a third of the way through the film, a 
quotation from “L’Amour d’un être mortel” is recited and discussed in the 
context of Bataille’s other main erotic novel, Blue of Noon, during an audition 
for the vague creative project—formerly a cantata, now perhaps opera, 
archive, film, sociological study—being developed by Edgar, the film’s 
protagonist. It is something Edgar has heard two years ago, the text of which 
he has now stumbled across at a bouquiniste’s stall. It deals with the 
opposition between the competing sovereign desires of the State and of love: 
You say love, but nothing could be further from the image of the 
loved one than that of the State, whose reason is opposed to the 
sovereign value of love. The State in no way possesses, or it has 
lost, the power to embrace before us the totality of the world, that 
totality of the universe which is given at once outside, in the loved 
one as object, and inside, in the lover as subject.19 
In an earlier reference (18th minute), Edgar recalls the woman he wants to 
play in his “film,” as offering “a real discourse, about the State, and the 
impossibility for the State to fall in love.” Then, towards the end of the film, 
which takes place two years previously, Berthe, the woman in question, 
gives what is in fact the “original” version of the quote, a shortened 
paraphrase of it: “You say the State, but nothing could be further from the 
image of the loved one than that of the State, whose sovereign reason is 
opposed to that of love.” 
  In purely analogical terms, given what I have already developed, one 
could understand the State/love opposition to be that between a certain 
order or regime of narrative cinema dominated by the image, and “music”; 
not just the opposition between image and sound, but between a present, 
perceived, sensory-motor cinema, and a potential or virtual musical 
“image.” In Bataille’s terms, the first would be “acquired” as part of a 
restricted economy, the second “consumed” in an excessive general 
economy. Blue of Noon, written in 1935, is the story of a first person narrator 
who, towards the end of the novel, makes a more or less conscious choice in 
favor of erotico-morbid consumption over participation in the Catalan 
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uprising in Barcelona. The revolutionary aspiration that the protagonist 
rejects, is incarnated, in the novel, by the character Lazare, understood to be 
modeled on Simone Weil, the subject of Edgar’s cantata project and a 
constant reference in Éloge. Edgar’s disillusion regarding the cantata, and his 
pursuit of Berthe, may be interpreted as an increasing sympathy for 
Bataille’s insistence on a complex relation between revolutionary and 
amorous excess. In referring to Bataille’s novel in the audition sequence, for 
the benefit of the actor who has never heard of him, Edgar regrets that when 
it comes to the Spanish Civil War, Malraux’s Hope, a classic novel of 
engagement, is consistently cited whereas Blue of Noon is ignored.20 
What we might call the immediate syntax of reference to Bataille in 
Éloge de l’amour, that which takes the three instances as they appear 
filmically, without considering their more complex diegetic chronology, 
provides a cinematic staging of the opposition I am describing. For if we 
compare the three instances, we hear first an imprecise mention (evocation 
of someone “not very attractive,” but who dared to say things), second a 
contrived recital (the audition), and finally the “original” instance (Berthe’s 
voice). The audition is filmed as is, with an actor given the script and asked 
to read it; there is no obvious rupture of cinematic continuity.  The other 
two, as it were framing instances, are less transparent. 
The first instance begins with a shot of three characters—a couple, and 
a solitary man (played by Godard)—sitting back to back on two benches on 
a Paris street at night.  
 
The ambient sounds of the traffic and the voices of the couple, whom we see 
laughing and speaking, are just audible (that ambient sound continues 
throughout and into the following sequence).  
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The next shot involves a cut to a black screen (between Edgar’s voice-over 
words “State” and “impossibility”), followed by the appearance of the 
intertitles de l’amour (“of love”) and de quelque chose (“of something”), part of 
the expanded version of the film’s title, fragments of which have been 
projected a number of times since the beginning.  
 
In the later instance, Berthe’s voice-over begins as documentary footage of 
three men looking at skeletons from the Holocaust stops with a freeze frame 
on one of the men, who turns and walks toward the camera. That still image 
cuts to a black screen (between the words “State” and “sovereign reason”), 
then again to a gramophone turntable with an LP record turning (the 
soundtrack will cut from “Bataille” to Celan reading his “Todesfuge”). 
During the voice-over one hears ambient footsteps, presumably diegetic 
(stiletto heels of the African-American assistant).  
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There is no music in any of the three sequences.21 
The audition, in my terms, is cinema, ordinary cinema. It may be 
something of a mise en scène of that ordinary cinema, even that ordinariness 
of cinema, which Edgar refuses, saying at the end “it won’t work,” such that 
we can hear his frustration being expressed in terms not just of the 
shortcomings of the surprised actor, but also of his whole project. The other 
two citations or evocations of Bataille exceed the economy of ordinary 
cinema, in the first place by means of the montage of, in each case, three 
contrasting shots: black and white street scene, black screen, intertitle; black 
and white freeze frame, black screen, gramophone. In the second place, 
however, the blank, black screen that occurs as the central shot of both 
montages exceeds the economy of ordinary cinema by presenting a form of 
cinema’s negation: an anti-image, the image of a lack of image. Now, if, on 
the one hand, we were to impose a structural organization, derived from the 
three-shot montage, upon the three instances of reference to or quotation 
from Bataille, reading them as another discontinuous montage connected by 
the dialogue track repetitions, we might compare the middle instance (the 
audition) with the middle shot of the other two instances, namely the black 
screen. That is: if there are three instances, and each of the three-shot, 
outside framing instances has a black image at its center, then the central 
instance can be read en abyme as black, in spite of its obvious visibility. That 
would make the ordinary cinema of the audition a non-image, equivalent to 
seeing only darkness, there being nothing much to see. Edgar’s 
disappointment reinforces that reading: it’s not going to work, the audition 
isn’t working, my film project won’t work, cinema doesn’t work, one may as 
well be watching a black screen. 
On the other hand, consonant with what I first suggested about the 
“music” of a potential or virtual image, we might be tempted to read the cut 
to black with voice-over relating to Bataille as more literally that, a cut 
“against” the image in the sense of a cut out of the image, into what can no 
longer be seen; not just into what can be heard instead, but rather into or 
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toward an outside of cinema where what is seen is seen as (though) heard. 
That would represent some sort of indomitable sovereignty of the “musical” 
image analogous to an image of the loved one in opposition to an image of 
the State; or at least a relation of cinematic elements whereby virtual and 
actual images correspond to image of loved one and image of State (and one 
cannot help but think that what resonated for Godard in the Bataille quote 
was precisely the word “image”). It would be important to understand that 
move toward an outside of cinema, into what I am calling the “music-
image,” as something very different from an ineffable, musical or mystical 
cinema such as is presumed by various commentators who discuss Godard’s 
work, and his use of music, from 1980 on. Laurent Jullier, for example, 
argues “that Histoire(s) is not so much a work of history as one of sensory 
experience, an attempt to reach the ineffable, mainly through the 
soundtrack”; James Williams considers that if Godard is silent about music’s 
“increasingly concrete and plastic role in his work” it is because “music is a 
mystery for him . . . . It is ineffable; it simply is.”22 On the contrary, I would 
have that musical outside of cinema understood precisely as history ([de] 
l’histoire), in contrast to just a story (une histoire), according to the delineation 
that is consistently made explicit in Éloge de l’amour. That is somewhat how 
Douglas Morrey would have us understand the “tender and unconventional 
love story” of the film, in the context of a history that has to be worked at, 
inasmuch as “the complex montage of Godard’s film, which requires the 
spectator to work to reconstruct a narrative, seeks to demonstrate this sense 
of history as an active process.”23 If Edgar insists on not representing a story 
to the extent of having his project fail, it is not because that story existed, but 
in a past that cannot now be retrieved; it is rather because he wants to 
represent history, that story as history. And if the difficulty of that story as 
history derives from its being understood as love, it would be not because 
love is in opposition to history (some opaque private story versus history as 
something public and transparent), but precisely because it deals with the 
very political intransigence of a love that declares itself to be sovereign. No 
simple image, no simple film, no simple cinema can represent that; it won’t 
work. If it can be figured, it is only in a relation between represented and 
non-representable, which is where the film leads by means of Bataille, into a 
black screen that does not reduce simply to no image, but rather tends 
toward a music-image. As long as the image is relating to what is outside it, 
a “crystal-image” in Deleuze’s terms, “the indivisible unity of an actual 
image and ‘its’ virtual image,”24 I would maintain that cinema is precisely 
prevented from falling, or leaping, via “music” into the ineffable. 
A number of elements reinforce what I am arguing.  First, in almost 
literal terms, the black screen of the first three-shot framing instance of 
Bataille, gives way to the words de l’amour, inscribing upon the blackness, 
however temporarily, a signification. (Some) love is to be “seen” here, set 
against the darkness. Something of the image of sovereign love, or 
something of the sovereign image of love, we read, is in, through, or on the 
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other side of this darkness. But that signification is quickly qualified by de 
quelque chose: love is not something abstract or ineffable, it comes to be 
historicized as the particular instance of love of something; the abstraction de 
l’amour comes down to some material level, the level of some thing. It has 
not been sufficiently emphasized in discussion of Éloge de l’amour that what 
is being praised in the title does not remain, for longer than forty seconds 
into the film--and no longer than a momentary shot of blank pages--simply 
love. Éloge . . . de l’amour . . . de l’amour . . . de quelque chose is how the title is 
read, and the words de l’amour . . . de quelque chose are repeated a minute 
later, and at various moments during the film. When the art dealers are 
speaking of Edgar’s project its title is said to be “something of/about love, 
‘praise’ I think” (quelque chose de l’amour, “éloge” je crois). The words quelque 
chose thus repeat both an imprecision, and a qualifying precision that makes 
the film no more specifically about love tout court, or Edgar’s love for Berthe, 
than it might be, for example, about a camera’s love for Paris, or love of 
cinema; and no more, as I am suggesting, about love through history 
(Tristan and Isolde, the resistance couple), than about love as history. 
The second reason to read the musical outside of cinema as history 
functions through the second framing montage, where the black screen is 
preceded by a still that evokes the Holocaust (spectators/museum visitors 
before a heap of skeletons), and followed by a spinning LP record that will 
come to be heard as Celan reading “Todesfuge.” We move from a 
documentary representation of the Holocaust, through black screen, to a 
poetic evocation of it, or at least to the proleptic announcement, on the 
image track (turning LP), of what will become a poem of the Holocaust. The 
cut to black is, of course, a cut to a type of contemplation that supersedes 
and exceeds what a documentary, however well-intentioned and historical, 
can tell us of the Holocaust; recognition of the impossibility of representing 
it, the impossibility of poetry after it. But, as I read the syntax of the images 
here, the black screen that appears immediately after we hear the words 
“th[e image] of the State,” goes further than the simple recognition of failure 
or the impossibility, for example on the part of cinema, of representing the 
Holocaust, which we know to be the structuring impulse of Histoire(s) du 
cinéma and, by extension, Éloge de l’amour. In the first place we are now 
“looking at” a State whose murderous totalitarian excess perversely rejoins, 
in Bataille’s terms, certain aspects of erotic excess, as is suggested by the end 
of Blue of Noon (which is not to say that Bataille thereby either encouraged or 
celebrated fascism). The Nazi “rising tide of murder” is clearly a proleptic 
fact of Bataille’s novel, and the culmination of the narrator’s sexual relations 
with Dirty—in particular the scene in the cemetery in Trier—forms a stark 
contrast, and a form of resistance (as well, perhaps, as a morbid attraction to) 
to the increasingly militarized social and political background.25 In the black 
screen said to be an image of the State we might be looking at such a history, 
one that morbidly or obscenely comes back to meet “love” on the other side 
of it. If there is music in or as that history, it would necessarily be a 
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particularly tortured music far from the contemplative lyrical form it adopts 
in most of Godard’s usages of it, on the other side of such lyricism. That, of 
course, is something music can be (as in the strident tones of Week-end). Yet, 
once the image cuts again, we take a further step beyond: Godard suggests 
by means of the LP, and then with Celan, that there remains, miraculously 
even, miraculously and torturously, the potential for more music, another 
lyric.  
 
The shallow focus of the close-up on the record means that it fades out of 
focus and into black about halfway up the image, so that the upper half of 
the screen is still as blankly black as the previous image. We can see this 
image less as one that comes to be attached by horizontal montage to the 
previous one, than one that is stuck to it, or half torn away from it. We see a 
half-image of previously unseen music—I think it is fair to say that a 
spinning LP signifies in the first instance music—and a half-image of music 
leftover from the black screen. According to this interpretation, the Bataille 
voice-over conjoined with the cut to black takes us out the other side of 
darkness into an image of music, and further still into the music of history 
recited by Celan. 
Lastly, we can see music as history by means of the very fact of 
montage, cinema’s rhythm of dialectical progression. Godard has used the 
interrupted time of montage, as exemplified in the syncopated effects we 
have been examining here, to greater advantage than any other filmmaker. 
Montage thus becomes, finally, as the film of the same title explains, our 
music. In Notre musique, notre musique is apposed, by Godard in his lecture, to 
the “principle of cinema,” which in his formulation consists in “going 
toward the light and directing it on our night…our music”: 
Shot and reverse shot. Imaginary, certainty; real, uncertainty. The 
principle of cinema: go to the light and direct it on our night . . . our 
music (Champ et contrechamp: imaginaire, certitude; réel, incertitude. Le 
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principe du cinéma: aller à la lumière et la diriger sur notre nuit . . . notre 
musique.). 
In the interrupted syntax of that dictum (whose precise punctuation is 
difficult to determine), music is in fact apposed either to the principle of 
cinema, or to our night. But as is clear from the immediate context of the 
statement, and in the syntax or narrative of Godard’s discussion up to that 
point, we can understand the principle of cinema to function by means of 
montage, the appositions of shot and reverse shot, by which there is either a 
simple repetition of sameness that masquerades as difference or as 
opposition (which is what happens in dominant conventional film – the 
example shown is from Howard Hawks), or a difference that emerges from 
an apparent sameness, for example two news photographs showing 
opposing sides of a political situation (Israeli/Palestinian, or as in the 
disturbing categorization of resistant or compliant concentration camp 
victims, Jew/Muslim26). In one version of the productive application of that 
principle, one progresses through the dialectic to achieve a truth about 
reality (light shed on our night); in another version, one achieves something 
closer to the sacred, in various forms (the iconic value of the Virgin of 
Cambray, or the martyrdom that the film’s young protagonist seeks and 
seems to achieve). Both are, as it were, beyond vision, at least cinematic 
vision: the Virgin has “no movement, no depth, no illusion”; the prospect of 
martyrdom (whose cinematic pedigree comes from Dreyer’s Passion of Joan of 
Arc) necessitates closing one’s eyes, providing a representation to oneself 
(“imagining,” as the subtitle has it), rather than looking. 
Much of Godard’s work of the period of these two films, and in 
particular the Histoire(s) du cinema project, involves intense investigation of, 
and experimentation with, that principle. That would already be another 
cinema, a whole other combination and juxtaposition of images, and of 
image and sound, an extraordinarily rich and productive reworking of the 
story and history of cinema that has been given us, especially in its relation 
to History as measured by a failure to represent, or even prevent Auschwitz. 
It would already be a transformation of the principle of cinema as it has been 
enacted in countless films; already an unheard music in and of cinema. 
Yet if we attend to the other side of the juxtaposition of our night and 
our music that Godard produces, precisely our music as our night rather 
than the light cinema seeks to shine on that night, it sounds different again. 
For in the images that accompany the explication of the principle of cinema – 
“go to the light and direct it on our night . . . our music” – Godard again has 
recourse to the darkness of a blank screen. At the point at which the words 
“notre musique” are uttered, the image is blank not just in the sense of dark, 
but rather emptied of the visible.  
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A lightbulb has been swinging back and forth across the screen while 
Godard emphasizes the effects of the shot/reverse shot opposition; mostly, 
it has swung just to the left and right edges of the frame--the bulb being 
dissected by those edges--but now it swings out of the field of vision.  
 
But it in fact swings more radically outside the range of its pendulum 
movement, for as it moves, left to right, to the edge of the shot, there is a cut 
to darkness while the words “notre musique” are uttered; then the light 
reappears from the left. We have a classic case of the bad splice that Godard 
has been provoking us with since the opening minutes of A bout de souffle. 
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But more than that: the movement of cinema has ceded the image to 
darkness and to the rupture of montage. Without that, Godard would insist, 
the image cannot tell any truth, it cannot shine any light, it cannot measure 
up to history. But because of that, Godard would seem to suggest, from at 
least as far back as Week-end, as I have tried to argue, the dialectic of 
juxtaposed images is subjected to its own outside potential, which is an 
excess beyond any simple opposition. If our music is heard in the film of 
that name, beyond the ECM extracts that form a rich counterpoint to the 
film, beyond montage as productive of a photocentric revelation, it is 
because it is understood also as the montage of our night, something seen 
beyond vision, something seen heard on the other side of the image. 
In this way Godard might be said to have achieved a visual montage 
of music, ceding the image to a type of sovereignty that exceeds it, but by 
means of its most intimate or immanent technological possibility. “In film,” 
he has said, “there’s rhythm, it’s more like music, that’s how I came to use 
black for rhythm”27: the rhythm, therefore, of a varied syntax of shots, 
whether exaggerated panning and static takes, complicated montage 
combinations, or the adventures in digital color of these later films; as well 
as the rhythm, as we have seen, that is punctuated by black. But it is not only 
in the sense of temporal measure and syncopation that music comes to be 
incorporated into the visual track. In staging cinema’s discontinuity—the in-
animation of montage that makes it tick—as a means to have it sensed 
otherwise, Godard creates for it a different type of flow.  As a result there 
resounds in his films the tonality and beating of another form of cinematic 
life. 
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Éloge between history’s recalcitrance and the elusiveness of that love story, “resolutely 
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that at one point in the extermination camps the Germans had decided to declare a Jew to 
be a Muslim” (Godard and Ishaghpour, Cinema, 105). 
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